

INF226 – Software Security

Håkon Robbestad Gylterud

2019-09-23

The world wide web

The internet and the web

What happens when we open the browser and type in
“www.uib.no”?

Web protocols, formats and languages

Communication on the world wide web (WWW):

- Domain Name Service (DNS)
- Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
- Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)

Browsers

- Perform **HTTP requests** on behalf of the users.
- Display pages in Hypertext Markup Language (**HTML**) containing:
 - Images (JPEG, GIF, SVG, PNG, ...)
 - Video and sound (MP3,MP4,OGG,webm, ...)
- Style the pages as described in Cascade Style Sheet (**CSS**).
- Executes JavaScript embedded in the pages.

Web-servers

Web-servers respond to HTTP requests.

- Static websites vs dynamic web sites.
- Dynamic: Any language can be used on the server side.

HTTP requests

GET is the most common request type. It fetches a resource at a specific URI.

HEAD fetches only the headers for the specified resource.

POST Posts content to a specified resource.

HTTP requests

GET is the most common request type. It fetches a resource at a specific URI.

HEAD fetches only the headers for the specified resource.

POST Posts content to a specified resource.

Each request contains headers which specify meta-data about the request:

- Accepted formats/languages
- Cookies
- User agent
- ETag
- ...

HTTP responses

The server responds with:

- a status message (200, 404, 500 etc ...)
- headers
- (possibly) the content of requested resource

Public key cryptography and authentication

Public key cryptography




Figure 1: Public key cryptography

Usage of public key systems

- Encryption
- Message authentication codes
- Certificates

Man-in-the-middle attacks




Figure 2: Public key cryptography

Authentication for public key systems

Public keys must be authenticated.

Authentication for public key systems

Public keys must be authenticated.

Many different schemes for this:

- Web-of-trust (key-signing)
- Trust upon first use
- Centralised certificate authorities
- ...

Trust upon first use

Assumption: The man in the middle does not strike the first time.

Trust upon first use

Assumption: The man in the middle does not strike the first time.

Mechanism: Trust the public key used in first session. Use that for authentication of later sessions.

Trust upon first use

Assumption: The man in the middle does not strike the first time.

Mechanism: Trust the public key used in first session. Use that for authentication of later sessions.

Works well for long-lasting trust-relationships. Or when no existing trust relationship exists (i.e. web-site registration).

Example: SSH key trust.

Centralized Certificate Authorities

Assumption: We trust a central authority to verify public keys for us.

Mechanims: Central authority verifies identity and issues certificates on public keys.

Examples:

- Browsers ship with a list of public keys of trusted Certificate Authorities.
- Organisations can distribute their own certificates for internal use.

Other schemes

For peer-to-peer authentication:

- one can use preexisting shared secrets (Example: Socialist Millionaire protocol)
- out-of-band communication (verification of key fingerprints)

Stream ciphers and Message Authentication Codes

Stream ciphers

Most modern cryptography is based on **block ciphers**.

- Fixed input and output length (for instance: 128 bits)
- Deterministic: Same key and input gives same output.

Stream ciphers

Most modern cryptography is based on **block ciphers**.

- Fixed input and output length (for instance: 128 bits)
- Deterministic: Same key and input gives same output.

Problem: Most applications have variable length input/output.

ECB



Stream ciphers

Stream ciphers




Figure 4: Stream ciphers

Stream ciphers are malleable


Stream ciphers:

- based on cryptographic pseudo-random number generators (CPRNGs)
- provides safe extension to arbitrary inputs

BUT: They are malleable!

Keyed hash functions

Message Authentication Codes



Keyed hash functions

A keyed hash function produces a hash, which depends on the key.

- Used to authenticate messages:
 - Derive a key from shared secret.
 - Sender: Computes keyed hash of encrypted message and attach has.
 - Receiver: Computes keyed hash received message and compare with attached hash.
- Provides both *authenticity* and *integrity*.

Keyed hash functions

Message structure




Figure 6: Keyed hash function

Question: Why is it important to encrypt first, not last?

TLS

Transport Layer Security (TLS) are protocols providing communication security.

- Current version (TLS 1.3)
- Previous versions include *weak ciphers*.
- Provides:
 - Confidentiality
 - Authentication (Via X.509 certificates)
 - Forward secrecy

If you need cryptographic transport security: use TLS 1.3.

Ciphers in TLS 1.3

TLS version 1.3 has drastically reduced the number of supported ciphers:

- AES in counter mode and CBC-MAC
- ChaCha20 and Poly1305 MAC

No more DES or RC4.

HTTPS

HTTP can be transmitted over TLS (HTTPS). Authentication provided by Certificate Authorities (such as Let's Encrypt):

- Same-origin protocol separates HTTP from HTTPS.
- Many sites still serve content over plaintext HTTP.

Logged in, and then what?

Logged in, and then what?

- User actions are often given in separate requests from the authentication request.
- How do we ensure that each request comes from a valid user?

Example: Webmail

1 /login

- User requests login form, and enters password

2 /inbox

- User posts login details to the inbox page
- Server responds with inbox, listing messages, after checking password

3 /delete?messageid=123

- User requests a message deleted
- **How can the server know the user is the same?**

Session IDs

The standard way solution is to use a **session ID**, which identifies the user in the following session.

Requires:

- Entropy: Session ID must not be guessable (random, 128 bits)
- Secrecy: Session ID must not be leaked:
 - HTTPS
 - Debugging modes often leak session IDs
 - Cross-site-scripting (Cookies: HttpOnly, SameSite).

Common pitfall: Lacking entropy

Special care needs to be taken when generating random salts or secret keys.

- Entropy is a finite resource on any system.
- Not all random number generators are suitable for cryptographic use.

Use the recommended source of randomness on your system!

java.util.Random

- java.util.Random is a Linear Congruential Generator (LCG).

Using java.util.Random is a very insecure source of cryptographic randomness:

- By observing only a few bytes of output from an LCG, one can completely determine the rest of the sequence.

(LCGs are well suited for statistical work and Monte-Carlo simulations)

Generating secure random bytes in Java

You can use `SecureRandom` as a general purpose source of entropy:

Code

```
import java.security.SecureRandom;
...
SecureRandom random = new SecureRandom();

final byte[] token = new byte[32];
random.nextBytes(token);
```

Generating secure random keys in Java

Different ciphers have different `KeyGenerator` implementations in Java. For instance AES:

```
javax.crypto.KeyGenerator;  
javax.crypto.SecretKey;  
...  
KeyGenerator keyGen = KeyGenerator.getInstance("AES");  
keyGen.init(256); // Specifying the key-size  
SecretKey secretKey = keyGen.generateKey();
```


Structure of a user authentication scheme based on passwords

- 1 Provide a way for user to authenticate server (ex: HTTPS w/valid certificate)
- 2 Establish a secure communication channel (ex: HTTPS)
- 3 User transmits password
- 4 Server verifies password:
 - Salted (128 bit)
 - Run through an expensive key derivation function (ex: SCrypt)
- 5 Server responds with a secure session ID
- 6 Client program stores session ID as securely as possible

Structure of a user authentication scheme based on passwords

- 1 Provide a way for user to authenticate server (ex: HTTPS w/valid certificate)
- 2 Establish a secure communication channel (ex: HTTPS)
- 3 User transmits password
- 4 Server verifies password:
 - Salted (128 bit)
 - Run through an expensive key derivation function (ex: SCrypt)
- 5 Server responds with a secure session ID
- 6 Client program stores session ID as securely as possible
 - Are there alternatives to sending the password to the server?
 - Two-factor would be better.