

# INF226 – Software Security

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# Security through the software development cycle

# The software development cycle

- 1 Requirements
- 2 Design
- 3 Implementation
- 4 Testing
- 5 Deployment

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**Question:** What security related activities can you think of in each phase?

# Security activities

The book (“Secure and resilient. . .”) suggests:




Figure 1: Security activities in the software development cycle

# Software security design

## Definition

**Software security** is the ability of software to function according to intentions in an **adverserial environment**.

# Designing secure software



Figure 2: Requirements, assumptions and mechanisms

## Designing secure software



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- 1 Identify security requirements** which capture the intentions for the software.
- 2 Make explicit the assumptions** about the environment the software will run.
- 3 Design mechanisms** which satisfy the requirements given the assumptions.



# Non-functional requirements

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- Security and privacy
- Availability, capacity, performance and efficiency
- Extensibility, maintainability, portability and scalability
- Recoverability
- Manageability and serviceability
- Cohesion

# Availability

## Definition

**Availability** is the proportion of time a system spends in a functional state.

**Question:** What causes downtime for software?

## Causes for downtime

- Malicious attacks
- Software bugs
- Hardware failure
- Failure of services
- Excessive usage (exhaustion of scarce resources:  
CPU/GPU, memory, bandwidth, threads, filehandles, . . . )

**Question:** How can we increase availability?

## Increasing availability

- Write **secure software**.
- Not having bugs (How?)
- Redundance
- Less reliance on services
- Testing (Example: Chaos Monkey)
- Scalability

# Capacity

**Capacity** refers to the maximum number simultaneous of users/transactions.

- What is the target capacity of the system?
- How do we determine the capacity?
- What happens if we reach the limit of capacity?

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Running multiple instances:

- Load balancing (example: DNS round-robin)
- Location
- Secure communication between instances
- Eventual consistency

# Performance

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- Rate of *transaction processing*

This covers both **latency and throughput**.

- What is acceptable performance?
- How does performance degrade when approaching the limit of capacity?

# Efficiency

**Efficiency** is the ability to make use of scarce resources such as:

- Memory / cache
- Processing power
- Storage
- Network bandwidth
- Latency

Increasing software efficiency gives a better performance/hardware requirement.

## Maintainability & extensibility

How easy is it to **develop and deploy fixes and new features**?

## Developing fixes / new features

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When multiple fixes/features are developed at the same time:

- Merging:
  - How often?
  - How to ensure quality?



# Deploying fixes / new features

How to securely deploy a new version?

- Possible attack vector: **Malicious updates.**

Most modern distribution systems include some signature mechanisms.

# Deploying fixes / new features

Does upgrading cause disruption?

- Downtime?
- Can different version coexist?
- Portability of persistent data
  - Serialization is brittle
  - Use data formats with clear specifications

# Portability

**Portability** is the ability of the software to run on different systems with little adaptation.

- Language dependent (Assembly vs C vs Java)
- Portability favours abstractions
- Documentation

# Recoverability

**Recoverability** is the *time to recovery from disruptive events*.

- Backups
- Failover systems (Hardware or virtual)
- Update deployment

# Cohesion

**Cohesion** is the degree to which parts of a system/module *belong together*.

Strong cohesion: each module is **robust** and **reusable**.

Contrast with **coupling**, the interdependency between modules.

# Threat model

# The threat model



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In order to perform this analysis we need:

- Functional decomposition (A diagram of software components)
- An overview of trust-relationships between components
- Good knowledge of specific security pitfalls (injection, XSS, CSRF, authentication, access control, ...)

# Security review

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Manual review happens in different phases:

- Security design review
- Peer review of implementation:
  - Reviewing commits
  - Pair programming
- Final security review (before deployment)

# Logging



## Developer error messages

Debugging/developer error messages should

- be logged to a separate, safe storage.
- be append only (enforced by storage mechanism and API)

**stdout/stderr are often not good for services**, because they are often redirected to surprising places.

# What to log

- Authentication events
- Attempted intrusions
- Violations of invariants
- Unusual behaviour
- Performance statistics

# What not to log

Not everything should go to the log:

- Sensitive information
- Keys
- Passwords
- User data

# Monitoring

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In order to respond to an ongoing threat four things must happen:

- 1 Detection
- 2 Logging
- 3 Monitoring
- 4 Response

## Example

On a server, a user has an insecure password.

- 1 An attacker logs in and tries to run `sudo`, which the user was not permitted to run.
- 2 `sudo` logs the event
- 3 E-mail automatically sent to administrator
- 4 Admin decides to lock the user account and reset their password

Why did this succeed?

**Question:** What (if any) mitigations should be taken after an event?

# Securing development and deployment

Security is important during development:

- An attacker who can modify the source code can make his own back-doors.
- How can we trust third party libraries and APIs?

# Muddest point

Answer at `mitt.uib.no`



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How should we write code to fully utilise the compiler's ability to verify our code?

How to make our intentions visible in the code? (How to write *what to do* rather than *how to do it*)